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CASHING IN ON CONVICTS: PRIVATIZATION, PUNISHMENT,
AND THE PEOPLE
Laura I Appleman*
Abstract
For-profit prisons, jails, and alternative corrections present a
disturbing commodification of the criminal justice system. Though part of
a modern trend, privatized corrections has well-established roots
traceable to slavery, Jim Crow, and current racially-based inequities. This
monetizing of the physical incarceration and regulation of human bodies
has had deleterious effects on offenders, communities, and the proper
functioning of punishment in our society. Criminal justice privatization
severs an essential link between the people and criminal punishment.
When we remove the imposition of punishment from the people and
delegate it to private actors, we sacrifice the core criminal justice values
of expressive, restorative retribution, the voice and interests of the
community, and systemic transparency and accountability. This Article
shows what is lost when private, for-profit entities are allowed to take on
the traditional community function of imposing and regulating
punishment. By banking on bondage, private prisons and jails remove the
local community from criminal justice, and perpetuate the extreme
inequities within the criminal system.
INTRODUCTION
In the pivotal opening scene in George R. R. Martin’s Game of Thrones, Lord
Eddard Stark, Warden of the North, explains to his young son Bran why he must put
on the face of the “King’s Justice,” and punish (behead) a deserter with his own
hands, instead of handing the job off to a hired executioner:
The question was not why the man had to die, but why I must do it.” Bran
had no answer for that. “King Robert has a headsman,” he said,
uncertainly. “He does,” his father admitted . . . . “Yet our way is the older
way. The blood of the First Men still flows in the veins of the Starks, and
we hold to the belief that the man who passes the sentence should
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swing the sword. If you would take a man’s life, you owe it to him to look
into his eyes and hear his final words.1
Eddard Stark professes and upholds a fundamental aspect of our criminal
justice system: punishment must be adjudicated, imposed, and regulated by the
people. Sometimes this justice is directly imposed by the people, through the
auspices of a grand or petit jury; sometimes this justice is enacted more distantly,
through the hands of the local or state-elected government. But all of it is done in
the people’s name, and only through their power.
The recent rise of privatizing punishment—spanning from for-profit
incarceration to privatized probation to private post-release supervision, recovery
homes, and parole—severs the essential link between the people and criminal
punishment. To paraphrase George R.R. Martin, we pass the sentence but sell, far
too cheaply, our right to swing the sword. In bartering away the right to enact and
regulate offenders’ punishment, by granting that right to private corrections
companies instead of the state and local community, we lose the democratic
legitimacy that undergirds our system of criminal justice. When we remove the
imposition of punishment from the people and delegate it to private actors, we
sacrifice the core criminal justice values of expressive, restorative retribution, the
voice and interests of the community, and systemic transparency and accountability.
Though part of a modern trend, privatized corrections has well-established
roots traceable to slavery, Jim Crow, and current racially-based inequities. The use
of forced inmate labor in private prisons is distinctly troubling, given that a high
percentage of minorities are imprisoned in private correctional institutions.
Monetizing the physical incarceration and regulation of human bodies has had
serious, deleterious effects on offenders, communities, and the proper functioning
of punishment in our society.
Policy makers, legislators, and academics all have raised concerns about the
rising tide of privatizing corrections. Although the ramifications of privatized
criminal justice have begun to be explored, little attention has been paid to the
negative impact upon the local community, particularly low-income communities
and communities of color. When we look at privatizing corrections through this lens,
however, we find additional reasons why the outsourcing of punishment to private
entities, by stepping upon rights traditionally reserved to the lay citizenry, presents
enormous problems for the proper administration of justice.
Privatized prisons, jails, and alternative corrections trample on our long-held
tradition of having all punishment decided by the local community. The imposition
of punishment onto incarcerated offenders by private, for-profit companies destroys
the established patterns of community involvement and control. The principle
behind our system of criminal justice—that the community should determine all
punishment for an offender—has import for all aspects of punishment, including that
meted out post-sentencing.

1

GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES 18 (1996) (emphasis added).
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When offenders are punished by private entities, it lessens the expressive,
restorative, retributive message normally sent by the community, since the offender
is punished by a for-profit, private entity. The community loses both its voice and
its means of participation. In addition, when we privatize punishment, the offender
does not feel the condemnation of the local community, but instead concludes that
her punishment is based on the profit motive of a private business. A critical social
message is lost.
Furthermore, the majority of our private prisons and jails fail to meet minimum
benchmarks on decreasing violence, reducing recidivism, and otherwise fulfilling
the role of retributive punishment, even compared to the low standards established
by public corrections. Shortcuts are frequently taken, ostensibly in the pursuit of
profit, that reduce the quality of life for offenders. Regulation of private prisons,
jails, and alternative corrections is usually minimal, sometimes with deadly results.
This Article explores what society loses when it allows private, for-profit
entities to take on the traditional community function of imposing and regulating
punishment. The physical imposition of punishment has traditionally and
historically been performed by the community, or by local government chosen by
the people. Only recently have we begun to outsource this right to private business,
leading to deeply troubling results.
Part I of this Article explores the perils of privatization in criminal punishment,
examining the growing reach of for-profit companies in not only private prisons, but
also jails, halfway houses, probation, and post-release supervision. This Part
additionally scrutinizes the outsourcing of vital services by both private and public
facilities.
Part II shows how privatization of correctional facilities and their services has
had strong negative effects on offender rehabilitation and reintegration into the
community. This Part demonstrates some of the negative results of private
corrections, including higher rates of recidivism, more damage to families and
communities, and higher monetary costs than promised.
Part III contends that the community’s role in imposing expressive, restorative
retribution on offenders provides some important theoretical and policy reasons why
the imposition and regulation of punishment cannot be outsourced to private entities.
This Part also briefly reviews the sordid history of private prisons, showing how the
privatization of criminal justice has always been rooted in slavery and Jim Crow.
Part IV examines the critical role played by local community-level social
processes in enacting and regulating criminal punishment. This Part carefully
explores the interconnection between delegation, democracy, and the community,
and concludes that crucial public values such as transparency, public accountability,
and legitimacy all suffer when private entities control local punishment.
Taking a different approach, Part V merges theory with practicality, exploring
how communities can become better engaged in regulating the punishment delivered
to wrongdoers in private correctional facilities. If society is to truly improve our
criminal justice institutions, then we must reintegrate the local community into all
aspects of criminal justice, including how and where we punish offenders.
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Once unmasked, the quietly expanding realm of private, for-profit corrections
reveals a crisis of humanitarian, criminal justice, and democratic legitimacy.
Overlooked and undetected by the average citizen, these for-profit correctional
facilities are the antithesis of our original system of criminal justice, papering over
dangerous and inhumane treatment with the false promise of cost-savings. By
banking on bondage, private prisons, jails, and alternative corrections remove the
local community from criminal justice, and perpetuate the extreme inequities hidden
within the criminal system.
I. THE PERILS OF PRIVATIZATION: DANGER, DEATH, AND DERELICTION OF DUTY
“It’s sardine time. . . . We a for-profit prison now. We ain’t people no
more. We bulk items.”2
Running a correctional facility differs from running a municipal sewage
authority. The moral, retributive, restorative psychological, and physical aspects of
enacting community-determined punishment on human offenders makes managing
corrections a complex, delicate, and extremely difficult task at the best of times. To
do all of this while simultaneously prioritizing profit is seemingly impossible.
And yet, in troubled financial times, the lure of privatized punishment for local,
state, and federal government seems irresistible. Private prisons, jails, probation,
parole, and post-relief supervision have boomed in the past twenty years, even as
incarceration rates nationwide have begun to decrease. From 1999–2010, the
number of offenders held in private prisons increased by eighty percent, compared
to eighteen percent for the overall prison population, a much smaller rate of growth.3
A. Squeezing Profits Out of Prisons
Approximately 193,000 offenders are currently incarcerated in private prisons,4
both state and federal. This number, however, does not take into account the many
more offenders who come into the orbit of privatized punishment, which includes
2

Orange Is the New Black: Work that Body for Me (Netflix web series June 17, 2016);
see also Meredith Blake, How ‘Orange Is the New Black’ and Other Shows Raise Awareness
of Criminal Justice and Prison Issues, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/la-et-st-orange-is-the-new-black-and-prisonawareness-20160616-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZU7J-FMHM].
3
CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: PRIVATE PRISONS
IN AMERICA 1 (2012), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Too-Goodto-be-True-Private-Prisons-in-America.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AEM-HM5T].
4
The most recent numbers are from FY 2015. E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2015 28 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CUG-D843]; Maurice Chammah, What You
Need to Know About the Private Prison Phase-Out, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/18/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-privateprison-phase-out#.xe2xWry5a [https://perma.cc/7ANQ-VYWN].
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private jails, private probation, private post-release supervision, and private
rehabilitation/halfway houses, as well as the outsourcing of critical prisoner services
such as transport, healthcare, telephony, and food. Roughly eight percent of all
inmates are held in private correctional facilities,5 and the number is likely to grow,6
as are company profits. Total revenues for private corrections are over $3.3 billion
per year,7 and private prison executives at the leading companies rake in enormous
compensation packages, in some cases totaling millions of dollars.8 Profits are ripe
for the taking when it comes to privatizing punishment.
1. Big Money for Big Companies
Who benefits from the continued growth of privatized punishment? Primarily,
it is private, for-profit corrections companies. The two largest publicly traded
players, private prison operators Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”)9 and
the GEO Group,10 have a combined market capitalization of almost $5.8 billion,11

5

Shane Bauer, My Four Months as a Private Prison Guard—Ch. 2: Prison
Experiments, MOTHER JONES (July 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/
cca-private-prisons-corrections-corporation-inmates-investigation-bauer/#chapter-2
[https://perma.cc/EXY3-QJXA].
6
Indeed, following Donald J. Trump’s election, private prison stocks soared; CCA’s
stock rose 43%, and the GEO Group’s stock rose 21%. See Jeff Sommer, Trump’s Win Gives
Stocks in Private Prison Companies a Reprieve, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/your-money/trumps-win-gives-stocks-in-privateprison-companies-a-reprieve.html [https://perma.cc/9FQD-TQ6Y].
7
Michael Cohen, How For-Profit Prisons Have Become the Biggest Lobby No One Is
Talking About, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/postevery
thing/wp/2015/04/28/how-for-profit-prisons-have-become-the-biggest-lobby-no-one-istalking-about/?utm_term=.0b923c4c3076 [https://perma.cc/W2ZH-Q6Q9].
8
DAVID SHAPIRO, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE
PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 5 (2011), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_
document/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LD6-LLMB].
9
CORECIVIC, http://www.corecivic.com/ [https://perma.cc/66P9-9GYH] (last visited
Sept. 1, 2017). In October 2016, CCA changed its name to CoreCivic, to better reflect its
diversification into areas like inmate transportation and residential re-entry programs for
former inmates. See Bethany Davis, Correction Corporation of American Rebrands as
CoreCivic, CCA (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.cca.com/insidecca/corrections-corporation-ofAmerica-rebrands-as-corecivic [https://perma.cc/PZT7-2BFU]; Sommer, supra note 6.
10
Geo Group, GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.GEOgroup.com/ [https://perma.cc/RW29
-EH8S] (last visited Sept. 1, 2017).
11
David Segal, Prison Vendors See Continuing Signs of a Captive Market, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/business/prison-vendors-seecontinued-signs-of-a-captive-market.html [https://perma.cc/6DDW-J7YA].
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controlling over seventy-five percent of the private prison business.12 These two
prison privatizers made over $360 million profit in 2015 alone.13
Who else profits from these private prison companies? Among other
individuals, many unknowing mutual fund holders. CCA’s largest investor is The
Vanguard Group, which owns fourteen percent of the company’s stock, worth
approximately $447 million in 2015.14 The Vanguard Group also holds eighteen
percent of the GEO Group’s stock, worth around $665 million in 2017.15 Blackrock
Inc., an investment firm, holds approximately eleven percent of GEO Group’s stock,
valued at $332 million dollars.16 Thus the private corrections conundrum is one that
affects many Americans, whether directly or, more remotely, in their stock or
investment portfolios.
CCA is the largest private corrections company in the United States, running
private correctional facilities all over the country, and owning a total of 61.17 Its
track record in running these prisons, however, is insalubrious, most recently
exposed by a journalist working undercover as a private prison guard in one of
CCA’s Louisiana prisons.18 CCA’s main competitor, GEO Group, has been equally
dogged with problems in properly running and supervising its facilities.
Private corrections companies come in sizes large and small. Apart from CCA
and the GEO Group, there are numerous smaller players to help split up the
remaining pieces of the private prison pie. Smaller companies, including
Management & Training Corporation, LCS Correctional Services, and Emerald
Corrections, hold multiple prison contracts throughout the country.19 Their prison
practices have proven equally troubling.
The Louisiana-based LaSalle Corrections, for example, owns local prisons that
incarcerate nearly 1 out of 7 prisoners in the state, providing minimum services for
bottom dollar:

12

JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES ON
PRIVATIZED PRISONS
4
(2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Q9R-RF4Q].
13
Donald Cohen, It’s Been a Rough Few Weeks for the Private Prison Industry,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-cohen/its-beena-rough-few-week_b_11121034.html [https://perma.cc/J8U9-WBE8].
14
The Corrections Corporation of America, by the Numbers, MOTHER JONES (July
2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/cca-corrections-corperation-americaprivate-prisons-company-profile [https://perma.cc/V2NM-Y853].
15
The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/
GEO/holders?ltr=1 [https://perma.cc/749Q-B5HV] (last visited March 2, 2018).
16
Id.
17
Clara Jeffrey, Why We Sent a Reporter to Work as a Private Prison Guard, MOTHER
JONES (July 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/cca-private-prisonsinvestigative-journalism-editors-note [https://perma.cc/93T3-SM3H].
18
Id.
19
MASON, supra note 3, at 2.
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If you are sentenced to state time in Louisiana, odds are you will be placed
in a local prison—a low-budget, for-profit enterprise where you are likely
to languish in your bunk, day after day, year after year, bored out of your
skull with little chance to learn a trade or otherwise improve yourself.20
More than half of all Louisiana prisoners are housed in these bare-bones local
prisons and jails.21
Large or small, one interest held in common by all these private correction
companies is a desire to freeze U.S. incarceration policies. For-profit prison
companies have lobbied heavily to try to ensure that meaningful sentencing reform
fails, since this would shrink their business. 22 Because private prison companies
exist for money-making purposes, “policies that maintain or increase incarceration
boost their revenues; from a business perspective, the economic and social costs of
mass incarceration are ‘externalities’ that aren’t figured into their corporate bottom
line.”23 Profit margins, not prisoner welfare, are their primary focus.
In part, this emphasis on the bottom line has motivated these companies to
expand into halfway houses, jails, rehabilitation centers, and other correctional
alternatives. As the country begins to wrestle meaningfully with shorter, alternative
sentencing, private corrections companies want to ensure they continue to capture
their slice of the market.
2. Violence, Sexual Assault, and Homicide
Even by the minimal requirements of correctional habitability, private
correctional facilities routinely provide prisoners an extremely low quality of living.
The ratio of corrections officers to inmates tends to be dangerously disproportional,
and reports of squalor, rape, and inmate uprisings have been a continued hallmark,
falling below the standards of government-run prisons.24 In twenty-one states, local
and federal investigations, official reviews, security reports, and lawsuits against
private prisons and their corporate overseers have recently unveiled a “startling
pattern” of riots, sexual assault, and homicide.25
20
Cindy Chang, North Louisiana Family Is a Major Force in the State’s Vast Prison
Industry, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 14, 2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/05/
jonesboro_family_is_a_major_fo.html [https://perma.cc/TFP8-SEU9].
21
Id.
22
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES
OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES 3 (2011),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2AV-W558]; Cohen, supra note 7.
23
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 12.
24
See Pat Beall, Prison Enterprise a Powerful Force in Backrooms, Behind Bars, PALM
BEACH POST (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/news/prisonenterprise-a-powerful-forcein-backrooms-beh/nbWyF/ [https://perma.cc/Y4F9-7FEU].
25
Id.
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A large percentage of these problems relate to the minimal staffing of these
private facilities. Many private correctional institutions routinely fail to provide
enough officers to prevent violence. 26 In addition, the correction officers are
frequently inexperienced, unable to maintain the tight control and discipline needed
to run a correctional facility safely.27 Equally dangerous, private prison guards often
receive minimal job training. As a result, private prison guards have high rates of
exploiting and assaulting inmates under their supervision.28 The business model of
these for-profit prisons requires that they spend as little as possible on officer pay
and training,29 even if the result is inmate violence, injury or death.
Even within the world of privatized corrections, CCA is notorious for poorly
staffing its prisons. In 1997, CCA staffed a federal prison in Ohio with officers who
had minimal corrections experience and then relocated 1,700 high-level security
prisoners from Washington, D.C. to reside there.30 Within the first fourteen months,
the facility experienced thirteen stabbings, two murders, and six escapes. 31 In
desperation, local officials sued CCA in federal court for failing to abide by its own
standards, and CCA was ultimately ordered to remove 113 of the maximum-security
prisoners from the facility.32
CCA is currently under criminal investigation by the FBI for falsifying 4,800
hours of guard posts required under an Idaho contract.33 CCA collected state funds
for guards who were never assigned to work. The Idaho facility amassed four times
the number of prisoner-on-prisoner assaults than the state’s seven other prisons
combined, a result of the badly inadequate staffing. 34 In addition, the facility,
nicknamed “the Gladiator School” due to its multiple intra-inmate fights, suffered

26

See Pat Beall, “Parade of Horribles” in Private Prisons, PALM BEACH POST (Nov.
3, 2013), http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/news/parade-of-horribles-in-privateprisonscost-cutting/nbdpx/ [https://perma.cc/3C9V-SWMG]. Indeed, recently CCA
admitted that it had lied about understaffing a particularly violent Idaho prison. Id.
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
Mike Brickner, Correction Corporation of America’s Loss Is Ohio’s Gain, ACLU
(Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/corrections-corporation-americas-lossohios-gain [https://perma.cc/A3VP-PZ6V].
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Who Is CCA?, ACLU TENN., http://www.aclu-tn.org/who-is-cca/ [https://perma.cc
/94FF-JHLA] (last visited Sept. 1, 2017). An independent auditor found that CCA failed to
fill at least 26,000 hours of required posts in 2012 alone, for an average of 500 hours per
week of missing security staff. Id.
34
Id.

2018]

CASHING IN ON CONVICTS

587

epidemic—and continuing—violence. 35 CCA was ultimately removed from
management, but not until after many inmates were seriously injured.36
The few officers provided by these private prison companies are trained to step
back and not get involved. CCA advises its prison guard trainees to not break up an
inmate fight, or even call for backup. Instead, guards are instructed to ask the
prisoners to stop fighting, and if they refuse, to just walk away.37 At some CCA
prisons, sometimes there are only two officers per 800 inmates at mealtimes, a
seriously inadequate ratio.38 Inside the general population ward, where the prisoners
spend most of their time, there is likewise often only one CCA guard per 176
inmates.39 On the segregated solitary confinement wards, CCA guards routinely fail
to check on the prisoners every thirty minutes, as they are required to do,40 creating
an unsafe environment for at-risk inmates. Guard towers surrounding the CCA
correctional facilities are frequently unmanned, permitting inmate escapes.41
The GEO Group has been equally negligent in its running of private prisons. In
2012, the U.S. Department of Justice found that a Mississippi juvenile facility run
by the GEO Group violated the constitutional rights of the youth detained there.42
The young men incarcerated in the prison were “sexually preyed upon by the staff
and all too frequently suffered grievous harm, including death.”43 Moreover, the
GEO Group provided virtually no care or oversight for their young charges,
including deliberate indifference to sexual misconduct with youth by correction
officers; excessive use of force by prison guards on youth; failure to protect the
inmates from youth-on-youth violence; deliberate indifference to the youth at risk
of self-injurious and suicidal behaviors; and ignoring inmates’ medical needs.44
This mismanagement is sadly typical for GEO Group-run facilities. In 2013,
inmates at East Mississippi Correctional Facility filed suit alleging “barbaric and

35

Pat Beall, Judge: Prison Firm Lied About Staffing, PALM BEACH POST (NOV. 3,
2013), http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/news/judge-prison-firm-lied-about-staffing
/nbfRx/ [https://perma.cc/5QHM-5W9F].
36
Kelly v. Wengler, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/kelly-v-wengler
[https://perma.cc/5FWU-ZR68] (last updated May 23, 2016).
37
See Bauer, supra note 5, at Chapter 1.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See id. at Chapter 2.
42
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice
Releases Investigative Findings on the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility in
Mississippi (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-releasesinvestigative-findings-walnut-grove-youth-correctional-facility
[https://perma.cc/LU2Q62Q9].
43
Id.
44
Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. to Phil Bryant,
Governor of the State of Miss. 5, 15, 21 (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/crt/legacy/2012/04/09/walnutgrovefl.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7WJ-XYC9].
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horrific conditions” at the GEO Group-run prison.45 An ACLU investigation found
that these prisoners were underfed, housed in filthy conditions, and held in ratinfested cells lacking working toilets or lights.46 Although government-run prisons
are hardly plush, the conditions in many privately-run facilities frequently go below
even the minimum standards.
Privatized federal prisons suffer similarly endemic problems. A recent Office
of the Inspector General report revealed that private federal prisons—managed by
CCA, the GEO Group, and Management & Training Corporation47—incurred more
safety and security incidents per capita than comparable public federal prisons,
including higher rates of assaults, extensive property damage, bodily injury, death
of a correctional officer, and improperly segregating new inmates in twenty-fourhour lockdown. 48 These results are meaningful, given that federal prisons have
considerably more resources and much lower levels of overcrowding than state and
local prisons. Thus, even in the best possible incarceration scenario, private prison
operators incurred a variety of negative and dangerous incidents.
In light of these findings, on August 18, 2016, the Obama Justice Department
decided to stop using private prison companies to run federal prisons. 49 As the
Deputy Attorney General noted: “[Private prisons] simply do not provide the same
level of correctional services, programs, and resources; they do not save
substantially on costs; and as noted in a recent report by the Department’s Office of
Inspector General, they do not maintain the same level of safety and security.”50
Given the Trump Justice Department’s recent rescission of the order,
however, 51 privately-run federal prisons appear likely to remain. The Bureau of
Prisons currently has twelve private prison contracts, which house approximately
21,000 inmates. 52 Combined with the number of offenders held by private state
prisons, a significant amount of those people incarcerated in this country are under
the supervision of the private sector.
45

Complaint at 1, Dockery v. Epps, No. 3:13-cv-326 (S.D. Miss. May 30, 2013), 2013
WL 2361045.
46
Id. at 2–4.
47
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS i (2016), https://oig.justice.gov/
reports/2016/e1606.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2Y2-XFLN].
48
Id. at ii.
49
See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen. to Acting Dir., Federal
Bureau of Prisons 1–2 (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/886311/download
[https://perma.cc/7WJJ-RJ7R].
50
Id. at 1.
51
On January 23, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions sent a memo to the Bureau of
Prisons rescinding the Obama administration’s August 16 order advising the bureau not to
renew any contracts with private prisons. Lydia Wheeler, Trump Admin Rescinds Plan to
Reduce
Private
Prison
Use,
HILL
(Feb.
23,
2017),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/320915-trump-admin-rescinds-plan-to-reduceprivate-prisons [https://perma.cc/8GRG-LWXL].
52
Id.
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B. Private Alternative Corrections Instead of Traditional Incarceration
For-profit prison companies are moving aggressively into the world of alternate
corrections, which includes private jails, halfway houses, probation services, and
rehabilitation centers. The number of offenders subject to private punishment
multiplies when the count is expanded outside of prison walls. The private
companies running alternative corrections—often the very same for-profit
companies that run the private prisons—have precisely the same profit-based
motivation, and tend to use the same business models.53
Largely due to concern over sentencing reform, investors and private prison
companies have started investing in alternative correction services, such as private
halfway houses, electronic monitoring, private probation, “civil commitment”
centers for sex offenders, and for-profit residential treatment facilities. 54 These
“alternatives” to incarceration can be very profitable, especially if they are run
similarly to privately-owned prisons.
1. Private Probation and Post-Release Supervision
Private probation companies have greatly expanded in recent years. As of 2016,
over 1,000 courts, most in the South but including Michigan and Washington State,
have transferred the supervising and fee-collection from misdemeanor offenders to
private probation companies.55 These private companies often advertise themselves
to impoverished state and local governments as an inexpensive way to punish lowlevel offenders while keeping them out of costly jails.56
These probation companies, however, frequently end up indebting
probationers, not rehabilitating them. 57 Probation privatizers make money from
imposing numerous fees on probationers, fees that multiply with penalties and
interest if the offender cannot pay.58 And when offenders cannot pay, arrest and
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imprisonment often follows, sometimes based on warrants drafted by probation
companies and issued by the courts.59
In addition to debt collection, many private probation companies also offer
electronic monitoring, drug testing, and even behavioral-therapy courses, 60 all at
little to no cost to local governments and courts.61 In truth, private probation services
transfer the financial burden of probation directly onto offenders, all while taking
their monetary cut. The result is that most offenders, who tend to be impoverished,
spend the rest of their lives trying to pay off their criminal justice debt.62 Local
governments that use private probation services essentially turn courts into debtcollection machines, with the profits going to the private companies. The objective
no longer focuses on best interest of either the defendant or society.63
All courts struggle to collect criminal justice debt from offenders, whether they
utilize the services of private probation companies or not. Private probation fees,
however, are often substantially greater than what states charge for equivalent
services, as many states charge nothing at all.64 These private supervision fees can
increase criminal justice debt significantly, and lead to more incarceration in the
long run.65
Furthermore, the competition among private probation companies for
profitable, exclusive contracts with local courts can engender corruption among both
court and company officials.66 For example, ten years of private probation in Idaho
was shut down after allegations of profiteering and illegal fees. 67 Likewise, in
Tennessee, private probation companies have been so rapacious in their eagerness
to extract fees from offenders that some of them are afraid to leave the house.68 One
major private probation company, Judicial Correction Services, has been repeatedly
sued in Alabama and Mississippi for racketeering and extortion, among other
charges. 69 In the world of private probation, both transparency and oversight are
extremely rare.70
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Another problem with privatized probation companies is the trend of “netwidening”: placing more people into the criminal justice system, and keeping them
there longer, 71 even if they’re not behind bars, for purposes of profit. Thus,
“[i]nstead of moving [rehabilitated offenders] into the community, with some form
of accountability,” 72 these companies simply continue to have them wear the
electronic monitoring hardware, thereby stretching out the payment plans and the
profits. Allowing probation to be run for profit often means that probationary
decision-making shifts from ostensibly neutral courts to for-profit companies, ones
that use probation not only as a tool to extract fees from offenders,73 but also to
extend offenders’ time under supervision, ultimately increasing profits.
2. Private Halfway Houses and Re-Entry Programs
The private corrections industry has also begun investing in extra-carceral
services. In 2013, for example, CCA purchased Correctional Alternatives, which
specializes in prisoner re-entry programs, like work furloughs and home
confinement.74 Likewise, the GEO Group now owns a variety of “community reentry services” and treatment programs, having purchased the country’s largest
electronic-monitoring firm, BI Incorporated, in 2011.75 This expansion may well be
a concern if these programs are run similarly to the private prisons, jails, and
probation services, as it is unlikely the focus will be on rehabilitation.
A cautionary tale is provided by New Jersey’s experience with Community
Education Centers (“CEC”), a privately run, for-profit rehabilitation company. In
the 1990s, New Jersey began outsourcing its prisoner re-entry and halfway houses
to CEC, resulting in client neglect, abuse, and outright chaos. 76 Roughly forty
percent of all New Jersey state prisoners enter a halfway house after prison, and
Community Education Centers controlled most of those. 77 Conditions at these
private halfway houses were shocking, far worse than those run by the state. In one
year alone, 185 offenders escaped from the houses, 78 many of them violent
offenders, and life within the centers was dangerous and unregulated. Problems with
CEC’s halfway houses have not been limited to New Jersey; in 2011, an Indiana
inmate died due to untreated pregnancy complications, and Colorado inmates
71
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described assaults, gang violence and rampant drug use.79 Despite these problems,
CEC was acquired by the GEO Group, which now provides both residential and
non-residential re-entry programs.80
Transitional and halfway houses have proved a profitable undertaking for
private prison companies. The GEO Group, for example, took over the Southeast
Texas Transitional Center in October 2010, and during its first two years, six people
escaped from a halfway house for high-risk sex offenders.81
On the whole, private halfway houses run by large for-profit companies have a
poor track record, far worse than non-profit halfway houses and rehabilitation
centers. Avalon Correctional Services, one of the country’s largest for-profit
halfway house companies, is notorious for drug use, sales, and overdoses in its
residences, as well as guards staging fights where inmates were forced to beat each
other bloody.82 Allegations were made that the beatings had an economic motive; in
lieu of punishing residents by sending them back to prison (which would cost Avalon
money from lost clients), facility administrators relied on “informal discipline” to
ensure that offenders remained at the halfway house.83 In addition, Avalon has been
sued by several female inmates alleging that they suffered sexual abuse during their
work-release program, where administrators routinely ignored their complaints.84
It seems that any profit motive in the recovery industry leads to trouble. For
example, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, privately-run “sober houses” were discovered
to have provided drugs to the residents, paid bribes to get a steady stream of wellinsured patients, committed insurance fraud, condoned sexual abuse, and even taken
residents’ phones and car keys, thus making it impossible for them to leave.85 The
almost complete lack of regulation and vulnerable natures of the addicts trying to
rehabilitate in these houses made the residents particularly easy to exploit, 86 a
common theme in corrections privatization.
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3. Private Jails
Jails have also not been immune to the privatization spree. Although there are
bad conditions in many local jails, the worst conditions have arisen from privatelyrun facilities. One such example is the Jack Harwell Detention Center in Waco,
Texas, run by LaSalle. Lawsuits filed against the facility have claimed that
employees there routinely refused mental-health treatment, essential medications
and medical care to detainees, and falsified documents to cover up their failure to
perform visual checks on at-risk people.87 There is a separate suit claiming the jail
ignored multiple sexual assaults on a female detainee by a corrections officer. 88
Multiple sources have described the Harwell Detention Center as an out-of-control
institution rife with smuggling, extortion and drug abuse.89
Likewise, the GEO Group-owned CEC has had continual problems with its
privatized short-term facilities. In the past two years, CEC has been under scrutiny
for a number of health and safety issues, and is currently facing a wrongful death
suit from a Dallas family that alleges their family member was given improper
medical care while in CEC custody, leading to his death.90
CEC is also under investigation for the 2015 deaths of two prisoners in a single
week at a Houston, Texas jail.91 The Texas Commission on Jail Standards found
multiple problems at the facility, including infrequent inmate observations,
incomplete suicide prevention screening, and improper distribution of medication.92
This privately-run jail has repeatedly failed Texas correctional standards, including
failing to complete mental disability/suicide screening forms, not properly
distributing medicine, no access to drinking water, cells with broken locking
mechanisms, and facilities with broken toilets and showers. 93 These types of
violations, ranging from minor to severe, are a constant feature for privately run
jails, marking a definite worsening of conditions from government-run jails.
87
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4. Privatized Juvenile Corrections
Similar concerns have arisen with the privatization of juvenile correctional
facilities. Over 40,000 children are currently incarcerated in privately operated
juvenile facilities. 94 This is approximately forty percent of the nation’s juvenile
offenders incarcerated in private facilities, a figure that has grown roughly thirtythree percent in the past fifteen years. 95 Although some of these private juvenile
correction centers are not-for-profit operations, a large number of them are forprofit.96 The end result makes money off the backs of young offenders.
Privatized youth correction facilities routinely cut costs by shrinking staffing,
often with dangerous results. For example, at the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional
Facility, a GEO Group-run Mississippi private prison, there was only one
correctional officer employed for every 120 juvenile prisoners. 97 High rates of
violence resulted, as there were too few staff to properly supervise the children, with
twenty-seven assaults per one hundred offenders in 2013.98 As was detailed in a
Department of Justice report, minimal staffing, bad management, and lax oversight
turned the youth detention center into an armed camp, where “female employees had
sex with [juvenile] inmates, pitted them against each other, gave them weapons and
joined their gangs.”99
Despite these serious problems, states like Florida have outsourced all their
juvenile corrections to private, for-profit companies. 100 The children and young
adults incarcerated in Youth Services International (“YSI”) prisons, jails, and
halfway houses across the country have undergone beatings, neglect, sexual abuse,
and unsanitary food over the past two decades. 101 YSI would routinely hold the
children past their release dates in order to make more money.102 Since there was no
true scrutiny of privatized juvenile facilities, the company simply fabricated the
necessary paperwork for its annual state quality assurance evaluations, time and time
94
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again.103 This glossing over of problems for the state audit was routinely ignored,
since many Florida state employees wound up going to work for the same private
contractors they regulated.104
Like many private corrections companies, YSI has managed to keep operating
over the years by careful grooming of state political connections at the highest levels,
and cleverly gaming the private contracting system by pulling out of state contracts
whenever an investigation looked likely.105 These practices have been going on for
over twenty years—whenever one of YSI’s facilities was about to be shut down, the
company would withdraw from the state contract before any damaging reports were
filed, and then another facility, with a new name, would simply take its place.106
As in all aspects of criminal justice, when the profit motive enters the realm of
juvenile corrections, it is hard to eradicate. In the 2009 “Kids for Cash” scandal, for
example, two Pennsylvania judges and two privatized juvenile corrections owners
were charged with accepting and giving bribes in exchange for sending children to
various forms of privatized punishment, including private boot camp, boarding
school, wilderness camp, and juvenile detention facilities.107 These children were
often accused of nothing more than a misdemeanor, and appeared in court without
lawyers.108 Over a million dollars in bribes were paid.109 Critically, “Kids for Cash”
began when one of the judges shut down the state juvenile detention centers in favor
of a private, for-profit company facility. 110 Once the sneaking tendrils of profitmaking have taken root, they are very hard to eradicate, even when the profits come
at the expense of children’s health, safety, and rights.
C. Outsourcing Essential Prison Services
Although some outsourcing may be necessary in today’s complex corrections
environment, the use of external, for-profit providers for needs as varied as health
care, food, phone services, and visitation has significantly decreased the quality of
life for inmates, while increasing the money that goes to these private companies.
The increased costs to inmate well-being, health, and safety, as well as the numerous
lawsuits that have arisen from the substandard health care provided, illustrate how
costly these private providers can be.
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1. Privatized Prison Health Care
One major expansion of privatized correction services has been in inmate
health care.111 Many states have outsourced their prison healthcare, attempting to cut
costs in tight times.112 The federal system has increased its healthcare outsourcing
as well; federal spending on privatized inmate healthcare increased by twenty-four
percent—to $327 million—between 2010 and 2014.113 In 2014, sixty-nine prisons
were surveyed and all of them paid much more for medical services than the
Medicare rates, with some prisons spending as much as 385% more for private
healthcare. 114
Despite its expense, outsourcing prison healthcare has not been beneficial for
medically fragile inmates, who have routinely been denied medical care and accused
of faking their health problems.115 Some of this neglect has led directly to prisoner
deaths. In 2005, for example, the lackadaisical and neglectful health care provision
from Prison Health Services led to two deaths in New York state prisons.116 One
death was caused by a jail medical director cutting off all but a few of an inmate’s
thirty-two daily pills, needed to control Parkinson tremors, with the nurses ignoring
the inmate’s subsequent pleas. 117 Ten days later, when the man died, the prison
officers doctored the records to cover up the abuse and neglect.118 Two months later,
another inmate’s chest pains were ignored and treated only with Ben-Gay and
arthritis medicine.119 Ten days later, she died of a heart attack at age thirty-five.120
Prison Health Services, the for-profit corporation overseeing these New York
prison health services, obtained numerous corrections contracts by claiming that it
could provide medical care, recruit doctors, and battle lawsuits, all at a cost lower
than what the state was currently paying.121 In the end, however, the costs were far
higher than predicted. Prison Health Services provided substandard care for inmates
by following a deadly blueprint: “medical staffs trimmed to the bone, doctors
underqualified or out of reach, nurses doing tasks beyond their training, prescription
111
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drugs withheld, patient records unread and employee misconduct unpunished.”122
Despite numerous deaths, minimal service, and outright neglect, however, along
with millions of dollars in lawsuits, Prison Health Services continues to provide
medical care to jails and prisons throughout the United States.123
Likewise, Correctional Medical Services (“CMS”) has provided similarly
neglectful care for inmates over the years, due in large part to its role as “the nation’s
cheapest provider, a perfect convergence of big business and low budgets.”124 CMS
has routinely rejected hepatitis screening and treatment for inmates, despite the
contagious and deadly nature of the disease. 125 This casual attitude towards
contagious disease 126 is not only dangerous for inmates, but also threatens the
general health of the public in the long run.
California prisons have also suffered from low-quality private health care.
Between 2004 and 2014, approximately 200 inmates died under the “care” of
California Forensic Medical Group (“CFMG”), a private prison healthcare
company.127 Excluding homicide, this works out at a death rate of roughly 1.7 per
1,000 inmates at CFMG facilities, compared with 1.5 in other facilities.128
Overall, approximately forty percent of all prison health care is farmed out to
for-profit providers.129 The problem with such medical provision is two-fold. First,
as detailed above, the quality of care provided is dangerously bad. In addition,
however, there is simply no transparency or accountability provided by these private
correctional medical providers.130 As journalist Wil Hylton observed:
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[P]rivate companies . . . feel no responsibility, and have no legal
obligation, to account to the public for what goes on inside their
facilities. . . . [They] choose[] not to provide any accounting of how that
money is spent or even how much of it is spent—and how much unspent,
to be pocketed as profit.131
The combination of ruthless cost cutting, negligent medical care, and lack of
transparency has created a space where profit overtakes minimal prisoner health
requirements, resulting in malpractice, mistreatment, and death. As one district court
monitor in Georgia described, the “care” provided by these companies created a
“medical gulag.”132
Despite all of these problems with Correctional Medical Services and Prison
Health Services, however, in 2011, Valitas Health Services (the parent company of
Correctional Medical Services) acquired Prison Health Services, creating a
correctional health care goliath.133 Renamed Corizon, the company now serves more
than 400 facilities.134 Currently the largest correctional health care provider, Corizon
earned $1.4 billion in 2014, providing services for around 345,000 inmates in
twenty-seven states. 135
Like its predecessors, Corizon has repeatedly provided extremely substandard
health care for inmates. Across the country, most recently in Indiana, Florida, and
New York, advocates and officials have accused Corizon of cutting corners to save
money, resulting in inadequate care.136 Allegations have been repeatedly raised, with
specific complaints that in order to control its costs, Corizon is reluctant to prescribe
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certain medications or send offenders for specialized testing, diagnoses, or
treatment.137 Corizon recently expanded its range of prison services, now including
medical, mental health, rehab, dental, and vision, 138 despite its often borderlinenegligent health services.139
Overall, private prison healthcare providers, whether large or small, do a poor
job of providing medical services to inmates. As two economists from the University
of California, Santa Barbara found in a 2007 study, even though states obtained
lower costs with outsourced prison healthcare, using these companies led to higher
inmate mortality rates.140 Granted, state-provided prison health care is no panacea.141
The evidence seems to show, however, that outsourcing health services to for-profit
companies results in even worse care, with only questionable savings. 142 Even
within the world of prison privatization, the private prison health care industry’s
metastatic growth and ferocious hunger for profit raises a note of extreme caution.143
The health care provided in private correctional facilities is minimal. Any time
an inmate is taken to a hospital, the private prison company must pay for her stay,
which cuts into profit.144 In addition, the prison must send two guards to watch over
the inmate while she is in the hospital, which also adds up.145 As repeated lawsuits
have shown, CCA and other prison privatizers shirk providing necessary medical
attention in even the most critical of times.146 Numerous experiences of outright
137
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denial of care to ailing inmates, criminal neglect, and insufficient medical protocols
when care is provided have led to repeated cases of injury and death.147
Mental health care in private prisons fares no better. One CCA prison in
Louisiana, incarcerating more than 1,500 inmates, had no full-time psychiatrists and
only one full-time social worker.148 This was in contrast to the publicly run prisons
in Louisiana—one of the most poorly funded public prison systems in the country—
which have at least three full-time mental health counselors.149
In sum, the indifference to suffering and the rampant cost-cutting found in
privatized prison health care makes it unsustainable and unsupportable. Even
compared to the low standard of medical care provided in America’s governmentrun prisons, private prison healthcare has been a failure.
2. Private Prison Transport
The privatization of interstate prisoner transport has resulted in the abuse and
death of both indicted and convicted offenders. Over the past sixteen years, as
private, for-profit companies have taken over prisoner transportation, four offenders
have died, fourteen have alleged abuse, both physical and sexual, and over fifty have
escaped.150 In addition, the conditions in these private transport vans are routinely
inhumane, causing unnecessary suffering and punishment. Prisoners routinely pass
out from heat-stroke, vomit, panic, get dehydrated, urinate and defecate on
themselves, and have withdrawals from their medications during the long journeys
from one correctional facility to another.151
Prisoner Transportation Services of America (“PTS”), the country’s largest forprofit extradition company, routinely transports suspects and offenders in
lamentable conditions.152 A typical PTS transport van crams roughly fifteen people,
male and female, into seats inside a backseat cage, each handcuffed and shackled at
the waist and ankles.153 There is usually little to no air-conditioning, and no way to
lie down to sleep during the long, rough trips around the country as the vans pick up

http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/GRL_Dirty_Thirty_formatted_for
_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LXN-M4DG].
147
Id.
148
Bauer, supra note 5, at Chapter 3.
149
Id.
150
See Eli Hager & Alysia Santo, Private Prisoner Vans’ Long Road of Neglect, N.Y.
TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/us/prisoner-transport-vans.html
[https://perma.cc/P26J-THCN].
151
Fernando Colon & Eli Hager, The Horrible Things I Saw in a Van Packed with
Prisoners, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 7, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/07
/07/the-horrible-things-i-saw-driving-a-van-packed-with-prisoners [https://perma.cc/SHV9G8VB].
152
Hager & Santo, supra note 150.
153
Id.

2018]

CASHING IN ON CONVICTS

601

detainees for transport.154 Although the driving is erratic and often dangerous, there
are no seatbelts for the detainees.155 Sometimes there is abuse from the guards, both
physical and sexual.156
Female prisoners face a particular risk of sexual assault by guards during
transport.157 Since 2000, at least fourteen women have filed civil or criminal lawsuits
against private transportation companies alleging they were sexually assaulted while
being transported from one correction facility to another.158
The privatization of prisoner transport tells a familiar story of private, for-profit
punishment, one of “a pattern of prisoner abuse and neglect in an industry that
operates with almost no oversight.”159 Guards have little to no training, and often
fail to recognize, or simply ignore, signs of serious illness.160 The cross-country trips
to pick up various prisoners can take weeks to complete. In addition, the pressure to
drive quickly and cut corners to make a profit has resulted in detainees being locked
inside the vans for days with minimal food and water, infrequent bathroom stops,
and no facilities in the van. 161 Furthermore, there is a wide range of different
detainees transported in the vans, and often suspects are mixed with violent
offenders.162 “Unruly” prisoners are locked in a segregation cage.163 In part, these
conditions have been allowed to continue because crossing so many state lines can
make jurisdiction murky. Federal regulators have shown little interest in stemming
such abuses, and the correction facilities that hire such private transport often try to
reject any accountability for prisoners not under their direct custody.164
Despite all these problems, the significant price differential between
government transport and private transport makes the lure of using private
transportation quite substantial.165 In 2016, twenty-six out of fifty states used private,
for-profit prisoner transport companies to extradite offenders from one correctional
facility to another.166 The private transport companies are also used by variety of
cities and municipalities as well. 167 All of this takes place with virtually no
governmental oversight. 168 In the case of private prisoner transport, any savings
made are at the expense of the comfort, safety, human dignity, and sometimes, the
154
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lives of those transported. Efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and ease of arrangement
should not be traded off for basic human rights.
3. Privatized Prisoner Banking
Current prisoner banking practices primarily benefit private corrections
banking companies. For example, JPay Inc. (“JPay”), 169 a private, for-profit
company that oversees inmates’ bank accounts, has charged fees as high as fortyfive percent to place money in an account. These inmate accounts are vital when
facing long periods of incarceration;170 the vast majority of funds paying for basic
needs like toothpaste, visits to the doctor, winter clothes, toilet paper, electricity, and
even room and board. 171 For approximately 400,000 inmates, there is no other
deposit option but this one. The choice is to pay the fees or go without.172 Although
companies like JPay claim to streamline the provision of money from families to
inmates, they have actually replaced the simplicity of sending money orders with a
system which charges high user fees per transaction to deposit money via a debit
card.173
But the disturbing aspect of JPay, its competitor Touchpay,174 and its prison
banking confederates is not just limited to their usurious user fees. As the Center for
Public Interest has noted, “[b]y erecting a virtual tollbooth at the prison gate, JPay
has become a critical financial conduit for an opaque constellation of vendors that
profit from millions of poor families with incarcerated loved ones.” 175 In other
words, private prison banking controls the provision of family funds to incarcerated
offenders, making it far easier for all sorts of private prison services to take their
cut.176
Correction facilities benefit from privatized banking as well. Besides
simplifying the transfer of funds, for every payment sent to a prisoner (usually at
least one transfer per prisoner per month) the company remits between $.50 and
169
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$2.50 back to the facility. 177 Little of this remission, however, goes to prisoner
services.178 The remainder of the profit goes back to the prison banking company—
for JPay, to the tune of $50 million in yearly revenue.179
Federal prisoners are equally captive to private banking fees. The Treasury
Department granted private companies such as Bank of America and JPMorgan
extremely lucrative no-bid contracts to service federal prison banking. 180 Since
2000, Bank of America has had a monopoly on federal prisoner banking, making
over $76.3 million for its oversight of the program.181 Similar to the state prisoner
banking system, Bank of America’s system allows it to subcontract with other forprofit, subcontracted prison vendors, placing it as the node of prison services
conveniently procured outside any government bidding process.182
When federal prisoners are released, JPMorgan then issues high-fee debit cards
to return to them the remaining monies from their own prison accounts, which
include prison wages and money sent from family members. 183 For example,
JPMorgan debit cards impose a $2 fee for an ATM withdrawal, and $1.50 for leaving
an account inactive for three months—fees that can easily eat up a released
offender’s remaining funds.184
4. Privatized Phone and Visitation Services
The high calling rates and numerous fees charged by private correctional phone
companies not only make money off the backs of a captive population, but also
reduce the contact and social bonds between prisoners and their home communities.
Prison administrators, both public and private, routinely select prison phone
companies based on the amount of commission offered to them. This commission is
derived from the very expensive phone rates paid by prisoners and their families.185
Currently, prison phone companies can charge eleven cents a minute to prison
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inmates, and fourteen to twenty-two cents a minute to jail inmates.186 This is an
improvement on the almost $1 per minute rate that was charged until 2015, when
the FCC capped the vast majority of prison phone and limited the amount of add-on
fees. These fees were a major source of revenue for prison phone companies.187
Such deals are money-makers for correctional administrators. In Los Angeles
County, for example, these commissions have a contractual guarantee of $15 million
a year. 188 The high rates end up limiting most inmate phone calls to the bare
minimum, given the poverty level of most families of incarcerated offenders.
Expensive phone calls can cause prisoners to communicate less frequently with their
families and friends in the outside world, which ultimately increases the recidivism
rate.189
In addition, prison telephone providers have helped pass legislation to ban
prisoners from possessing cell phones, despite the fact that most inmates only use
their cell phones to contact their families. 190 Securus, Global Tel*Link, and
CenturyLink, which control over eighty percent of prison phone business
nationwide, have spent millions of dollars on lobbying and political contributions.191
In 2010, Congress passed the Cell Phone Contraband Act, 192 which made the
possession of a cell phone or wireless device in a federal prison a felony punishable
by a fine and up to one additional year of incarceration. Several states have also
passed laws strictly punishing an inmate’s possession of a cell phone, including
Maryland, Arizona, and Alabama.193 These laws received strong support from the
three leading prison phone companies.194 Prisoners are thus left reliant on private
telephony and absurdly expensive long-distance phone rates to keep in touch with
their outside support systems.
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Finally, the growth of video visitation threatens to eliminate some in-person
prison visitation, once again increasing social and monetary costs for prisoners and
their families.195 Some video call companies require a ban on in-person visitation
before they will sign a contract with a correction facility.196 For example, until May
2015, Securus Technology’s standard contract required the jail or prison to eliminate
in-person visits.197
A startling seventy-four percent of county jails with video visitation have ended
in-person visits, which, for impoverished families who do not have access to this
kind of technology, can eliminate contact entirely.198 At last count, approximately
600 prisons in forty-six states have some version of a video visitation system, and
every year, more and more of those correctional facilities eliminate in-person
visitation entirely.199 Given the current demographics of inmates—overwhelmingly
poor, largely minority, many non-English speakers—having video visitation entirely
replace regular visitation threatens to cut off communication between prisoners and
their families, because the costs are so exorbitant.200
These video visitation systems are popular with correctional facilities because
the facility saves money in outsourcing visitation.201 Video visitation requires fewer
full-time prison staff members to escort the prisoner to a video terminal.202 Often
there are large sums to be paid directly to the Sheriff’s Department, local
government, or correctional facility.203
Further, these often expensive, bug-ridden video calls can actually increase
violence and discipline issues in correction facilities. 204 Early studies of the
implementation of video visiting have shown that incidences of inmate-on-inmate
195
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violence, disciplinary infractions and possession of contraband tend to rise after
correctional facilities eliminate in-person visitation in favor of video visitation.205
For example, disciplinary cases for contraband possession in Travis County, Texas
increased fifty-four percent after the county switched to video-only visitation.206
Thus, far from providing a better experience for the prisoner, privatization of
correctional facilities, whether in ways large or small, does them no favors. As
always, the companies themselves are the primary group benefiting from the work
of for-profit prisons and the outsourcing of prison services.
5. Privatized Prison Food Services
Another area of rampant correctional privatization is prisoner meal
provision. 207 Privatized prison food services have managed costs by carefully
measuring meal portions and, in some cases, reducing meals to only twice daily.208
The savings promised by these prison food providers have been hard to resist for
many counties across the nation, despite the inmate hunger that these services often
create. 209
Other problems with outsourcing prison meals include rotten or spoiled foods.
In 2014, Aramark Food Services was terminated from servicing Michigan prisons
due to, among other issues: failing to appropriately feed inmates; the use of
unauthorized substitutions or not preparing enough meals; and maggots and rodents
in and near inmate food sources.210 Aramark was also alleged to have failed to handle
food safely, failed to hire and train enough people to keep food from spoiling, and
failed to use food equipment properly.211 Similar issues occurred with Aramark Food
in prisons in Ohio212 and Mississippi,213 as well as in jails in New Jersey.214 This
kind of negligence, extreme parsimony, and potentially deliberate indifference to
205
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proper food preparation and staffing is a consistent hallmark of outsourcing jail and
prison functions to the for-profit world.
One common theme of this explosion of privatization is that moving from
public to private provision of corrections and services has been primarily beneficial
to the private corrections companies themselves. Part II discusses some of the
secondary effects of modern privatization on offenders, their families, and their
communities.
II. THE TRUTH OF PRIVATIZED CORRECTIONS: DAMAGED FAMILIES,
HIGHER COSTS
The privatization of correctional facilities and their services has had strong
negative effects on offender rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.
Although government correctional facilities often do a poor job in rehabilitating and
reintegrating inmates, private correctional services perform notably worse. The
failures of the private correctional system include higher rates of recidivism, more
damage to families and communities, and higher monetary costs in general.
A. Higher Rates of Recidivism
Academic research has shown that offenders incarcerated in prisons and jails
operated by for-profit companies have higher rates of recidivism than similarly
situated offenders who are incarcerated in publicly managed prisons and jails.215
This is largely due to their business models, which are dependent on continued
incarceration. Such higher levels of recidivism can be attributed to two primary
causes: higher rates of violence in private facilities, and greater difficulty for visiting
families due to out-of-state incarceration.
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1. Greater Violence
Private prisons are, statistically, more violent than public prisons.216 This is due
in part to the minimalist staffing policies in private prisons, which reduces operating
costs and increases profits.217 In Texas and Florida, where approximately a third of
all inmates reside in privately held prisons, employee turnover rates were fifty to
more than one hundred percent higher in private prisons than in public ones.218
Likewise, in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Idaho, company-run prisons have had
higher assault rates than public ones. 219 In general, prisoners who experience
violence while incarcerated are more likely to recidivate than prisoners who do
not.220
Moreover, guard pay is lower in private prisons than in public ones. According
to the U.S. Labor Department, median annual pay in company-run facilities was
$30,460 in 2010, twenty-one percent less than for correctional officers employed by
states.221 Lower pay means lower morale for correctional officers, which often leads
to greater apathy, burnout, and worse conditions overall.
2. Out of State Incarceration
To fill beds in the prisons they own, private prison companies routinely
incarcerate prisoners in locations far away from their homes, often in other states.222
As a result, prisoners often lose contact with their families and communities, making
them more likely to recidivate than those who keep in closer connection.223 As a
rule, the more visits an offender receives during her incarceration, the less likely she
is to reoffend when she is released.224
These visits from family and friends provide a critical way to establish,
maintain, and enhance an inmate’s social support networks. Strengthening an
inmate’s social bonds is important not only because it can help prevent the
assumption of a criminal identity, but also because, as discussed below, most
released prisoners rely on family and friends for necessities such as employment,
financial support, and housing.225
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B. Costs to Prisoners’ Families
Whether large or small, private corrections companies incarcerate thousands of
prisoners, often extremely far away from their friends and family. Although states
often house convicted offenders in correctional facilities far away from major
population centers, several states have begun incarcerating offenders in private
prisons located in different states entirely. Alaska,226 Arkansas, California, Hawaii,
Vermont, and Wyoming,227 along with Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, all
ship substantial prisoners to private prisons located out of state, primarily due to
prison overcrowding.228 Hawaii ships a full quarter of its convicted offenders out of
state—so many that CCA has dedicated a special prison just for Hawaiians in
Arizona.229 Washington State and North Dakota look like they will soon follow these
states’ lead.230
This out-of-state incarceration often severely curtails family visits, as traveling
over such great distances to see convicted family members costs both time and
money. 231 Since most prisoners and their families are disproportionately lowincome, both the logistical and financial challenges are often insurmountable.232 The
distance also takes its toll on children, who rarely get to see their incarcerated
parents, sufficing with infrequent phone calls or letters.233 This makes reintegration
more difficult for returning offenders, who often have lost touch with family
members and children during the long absence.
Moreover, housing prisoners so far out of state makes it very difficult for the
state to oversee operations. Private prison companies are notorious for contract
violations and safety and security problems, but there is much less a state agency
can do from thousands of miles away.234 It can be difficult to get accurate health and
safety information from out-of-state doctors and coroners.235
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In addition, long distances complicate a prisoner’s ability to keep up with court
dates, appeals, and filing deadlines, which can be short in duration and extremely
complex. California’s Prison Law Office has specifically warned that it can be
“difficult for out-of-state prisoners to get access to forms and information needed to
file legal cases in the California courts.”236
Likewise, it is more difficult for a prisoner’s home state parole agency to track
a prisoner’s progress, thus potentially incarcerating inmates for longer than
necessary due to incomplete information concerning rehabilitation.237 In a similar
vein, out-of-state inmates may have different or additional rights than in-state
inmates, and those rights can be hard to keep track of and preserve when incarcerated
in a distant, for-profit prison.238
Finally, re-entering society can be particularly difficult for out of state
prisoners, since all the contacts that make reintegration possible—potential
employers, landlords and social service providers—are far away. 239 Equally
important, studies have repeatedly found that visitation significantly decreased the
risk of recidivism, particularly with those inmates with little other social support.240
Since “returning prisoners face a number of obstacles to successful reintegration,
including unemployment, debt, homelessness, substance abuse, and family
conflict,” 241 housing them in far-away prisons makes the transition all the more
difficult and risky.
C. Questionable Cost Savings
Private prison companies thrive due to their alleged cost savings, promising
millions saved in taxpayer funds. Yet repeated investigations have found that these
prison privatizers base their contracts on imaginary costs and a set formula, saving
state and local governments little if any money in the long run.242 In part, this is
because private prisons can often cherry-pick the least expensive, least dangerous
prisoners for their facilities, leaving a state’s public prisons with the sickest and most
violent inmates, the most expensive and most difficult to house.243 Even when a
prison facility is outsourced, the state must continue to be involved. Generally, the
state is tasked with overseeing and administering private prisons in the correctional
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system, creating additional governmental cost, even if state employees aren’t
staffing or running the prisons.244
Minimal staffing of prisons and jails, as described above, is also another way
that for-profit prison companies save money, claiming to pass those lower costs on
to the state. But this bare-bones provision of correctional officers and security guards
imposes high costs on both inmates and guards. The pressure to keep costs down is
illustrated through not only minimalist staffing,245 correctional officer pay,246 and
training,247 but also in decisions that keeps programming for inmates, usually staff
intensive, at the barest of levels.248
Occupancy requirements are another way that privatizing corrections can cost
a state as much as running public facilities. A large majority of private prison
contracts—over sixty-five percent require the state or local government to guarantee
a minimum number of bodies in prison or jail beds, or else required payment to make
up for empty prison cells.249 Most quotas require ninety percent occupancy.250 These
quotas make state taxpayers responsible for guaranteeing profits for private prison
companies, instead of saving them money, as was promised.251
In addition, cost comparisons often fail to account for differences in health care
costs for sick inmates, who normally remain in state supervision.252 Contracts with
private prison companies usually restrict their inmate intake to those prisoners who
are healthy, young, and have fewer psychiatric needs.253 In Florida, for example, a
study done by an internal government accountability office found a variety of
problems with the contracts enacted between six private prisons and the state. This
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included failing to ensure that private prisons housed inmates with all different levels
of health needs, both mental and physical, as do the rest of the state prisons.254 As
special needs inmates are more expensive, accepting only healthy inmates in
privately-run prisons results in the state bearing a larger proportion of the cost of
housing them.255
A number of recent studies have shown that using private, for-profit companies
to run prisons and jails does not save state and local governments any money. In
2010, the Arizona Auditor General found that “it may be more costly to house
inmates in private prisons” than public institutions.256 Similarly, a 2010 New Jersey
study found that “most objective cost studies [of privatized prisons] show[] little or
no cost savings to taxpayers coupled with an increased safety risk.”257 And a 2007
meta-analysis of previous privatization studies by University of Utah researchers
found that “[c]ost savings from privatization are not guaranteed and quality of
services is not improved.” 258 Although other studies have found privatized
corrections provide some cost savings, the evidence is mixed, at best.259
Ultimately, the lack of oversight, extreme profits, lackadaisical attitude towards
prisoner welfare, and constant nickel-and-diming of impoverished inmates are all
hallmarks of what happens when privatizing corrections occurs in the criminal
justice system. Whatever benefits are gained accrue almost entirely to the private
entity.
III. PUNISHMENT AS A COMMUNITY RIGHT
When punishment of offenders passes from public to private, there are a wide
variety of consequences, and none of them are good. As the history of private
incarceration illustrates, private corrections in this country were built over a
quicksand of racism, slavery, and profit. The resurrection of private prison labor
gangs, “lent” out to local counties by corrections companies in an effort to buy favor,
draws from the same shaky ground.
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In large part, private corrections have been so trouble-prone because granting
the power to determine and impose punishment has always been a role for the local
community, not profit-driven outsiders looking to commercialize incarceration. The
more that private, for-profit companies are allowed to dictate the terms of
punishment and corrections, the less benefit either the offender or the community
receives.
A. The Troubled History of Private Incarceration
The practice of private payment for incarcerating offenders dates back to the
beginning days of our republic. In early American history, local governments would
reimburse private jailers for a form of pretrial detention, to hold the accused facing
trial.260 Early jails, which were primarily holding cells for debtors or for pre-trial
detainees, were overcrowded, poorly kept, and unsanitary.261
This first incarnation of privately-run corrections soon ended after the creation
of the first publicly run prison in 1790.262 Soon almost all offenders were confined
in local or state-run correctional facilities. There was one major exception, however,
to the eradication of private incarceration: the use of inmate labor.
American prisons have a long and disturbing history when it comes to profiting
from prisoner labor. In early prisons, prisoners were routinely put to work as part of
the larger purpose of prisoner reform.263 This purpose shifted during the Civil War
with the passage of the 13th Amendment, which outlawed slavery and involuntary
servitude “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.”264
Convict leasing, which was designed to get around the existence of the
13th Amendment, was widely utilized in the postbellum South. It both offered a
means to help defray incarceration costs as well as helped rebuild the ruins of the
South.265 The convict laws of the post-Reconstruction South were regulations that
were intended to help control and utilize black male labor.266 Following the Civil
War, eight Southern states enacted convict laws, which permitted the hiring of
county prisoners to plantation owners and private companies.267 In addition, nine
southern states adopted vagrancy laws, making it a criminal offense not to work, and
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applied them selectively to black men.268 This provided a constant stream of black
prison laborers. The system of convict leasing invariably resulted in severe abuse of
the prisoners, who were treated as less than human.269 Few if any of the monies made
were paid to prisoners.270
The purpose of both the convict and vagrancy laws was to help establish a new
system of free, forced labor.271 The South’s aggressive enforcement and punishment
of even minor criminal offenses against blacks created a market for convict leasing,
where prisoners were rented as day laborers to the highest private bidder.272 Soon,
however, Southern prisons and jails simply went into the convict-leasing business
themselves, reaping even greater profits.273 This economic bonanza created a strong
incentive to convict and lock up as many freedmen as possible to keep a steady
supply of labor.274
Prisons and jails continued to lease convicts into the twentieth century. By the
late 1920s, most states stopped leasing out their convict laborers, instead keeping
them to work on public projects in chain gangs.275 Legislation was eventually passed
requiring that convicts labor only on public works.276 The chain gangs of the 1930s,
however, differed little from the convict leasing system, relying on the same tactics
of humiliation and dehumanization. 277 Eventually, the chain gang’s widespread
abuses lead to its eradication around the middle of the twentieth century.278
The North had its private prison systems as well, distinct from the South’s use
of inmate labor and chain gangs. For example, New York utilized private prisons in
the nineteenth century, using a “fee system” where independent prison operators
268
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charged per-inmate. 279 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, for-profit
prisons and jails had been mostly eradicated, as concerns about safety, health,
sanitation, and conditions of incarceration led to widespread closure.280 Generally,
private businesses were only involved in providing contracted services to
correctional facilities, such as food preparation, medical care, and transportation.281
Concern about rising incarceration costs, however, resurrected privatized
corrections in the 1980s. CCA incorporated in 1983,282 and went public a year later,
contending that its use of surveillance and corrections facilities design made it
possible to run institutions with fewer guards.283 Under the name “The Wackenhut
Corporation,” GEO Group was created the same year, going public in 1997.284 By
1997, CCA had transformed into a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) for tax
purposes,285 claiming that it was primarily in the property-owning business.286 The
GEO Group eventually followed suit in 2013. 287 Also in 1997, CCA’s newest
affiliate, Prison Realty Trust, raised $447 million to buy more correctional facilities
to add to their growing empire.288
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What distinguishes these new versions of for-profit prisons from the previous
types private prisons is, in part, their marketing. To the founder of CCA, selling
private prison services is no different than selling anything else: “you just sell it like
you were selling cars or real estate or hamburgers.”289 Although CCA is marketing
the incarceration and regulation of human beings, not merchandise, the sales pitch
follows the same format.
One painfully familiar aspect of private prison practices is the resurgence of
inmate work gangs. Indeed, CCA has used its provision of free inmate labor as a
selling point to states, pointing out that in one of its first years of operating, Bay
County, Florida received $600,000 in “free” labor.290 Today’s use of inmate work
crews by private prison companies to provide free labor is all too familiar. Private
prison leasing of inmate labor commodifies poor minority bodies for state, local, and
commercial profit.
Allowing private companies to sell their services to state and local governments
not only resurrects the specter of slavery and Jim Crow, but also steps on the need
for the community to determine and impose punishments, as developed further
below.
B. Expressive Restorative Retribution and the Community
Why is it so critical that the local community, not private, for-profit companies,
help determine and impose punishment on offenders? For one, when a distant agent,
instead of the local or state government, is primarily or solely responsible for doling
out the moral blame of punishment, offenders may not feel responsible for their
actions, because the actual, physical fact of their punishment is so far attenuated
from the community who imposed it. When a private, for-profit company imposes
and enforces incarceration and its related punishments, the offender may instead
attribute her punishment to the private company, shrugging off the desired feelings
of responsibility or awareness of her wrongdoing. In contrast, when the local
government is in charge of determining and imposing corrections, the wrongdoer
has more difficulty avoiding the burden of criminal responsibility, because her
fellow citizens, community, and society itself has pronounced her blameworthiness.
The power of expressive values in criminal law and punishment play an
important role in corrections. Law and legal process has a strong effect on individual
behavior through their power to affect the social, normative meaning of that
behavior. 291 More specifically, community participation in the determination and
imposition of criminal punishment helps express the people’s beliefs and values
about the wrongdoer, the crime, and the injury to society. The expressive aspect of
the community’s decision is particularly apparent in the punishment phase of the
289
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adjudication and sentencing, since the actual imposition of punishment has always
had public, communal value.
By eliminating the community and local government from the imposition of
punishment through private corrections, much of the expressive value of community
punishment is lost. This sort of loss threatens the democratic legitimacy and political
salience of the state.292 To work properly, legal expressions such as the imposition
of criminal punishment must enlist and utilize the natural sense of justice among the
citizenry. 293 Delegating such punishment to a private, for-profit corrections
company makes this goal impossible.
Moreover, as a distributive principle, retributive justice supports the use of only
state or locally-run corrections. Every time the offender commits a crime, she
undermines the sovereign will of the people by challenging their decision-making
structure. 294 Because criminal laws in liberal democracies reflect a democratic
pedigree of criminal laws, crimes are expressions of superiority to the state and the
community. When we punish an offender who knows or should have known her
actions were illegal, she learns that her actions matter to the community—especially
a community created by shared laws.
By involving the will of the people through the imposition of punishment
within local and state-run corrections, it helps send the clear message that the
offender is being punished for the unfairness she created in the community.
Punishment imposed by private corrections, on the other hand, fails to send this
message, because the penance is imposed by an outside source, completely
unconnected to the state, government, or community. A framework of retributive
justice cannot function without some involvement from the lay public, since its
legitimacy is threatened without the actual imposition of punishment from the
community. Thus, whatever retributive meaning a punishment may have is almost
entirely lost in the realms of private corrections.
Restorative justice also has an important role to play when the community is
involved with crime and punishment. Most supporters of restorative justice
understand it to include a set of moral and substantive principles, including
responsibility, remorse, atonement, making amends, moral learning, forgiveness,
and reconciliation. 295 Restoring fairness and equalizing the community are
important components of restorative justice, which envisions crime as “a violation
of people and relationships that creates obligations to make things right.”296
A restorative theory of punishment conceptualizes justice as a process that
incorporates both the community and the offender in an attempt to repair and
292
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reconcile the harm done. 297 Private correction companies, on the other hand,
envision crime and justice only as routes to profit. Neither retributive nor restorative
justice can result from privatizing our state punishment, as our current system of
private punishment, run by large for-profit companies, has money-making as its
primary goal.
Restorative justice also contains aspects of expressive philosophy, because
expressive theories help publicize the negative aspects of the crime and convey
punishment’s condemning message.298 Restorative justice processes promote social
disapproval of crime by the very expression of condemnation handed down by the
community. This is far more meaningful than punishment imposed by private
companies. In the restorative justice paradigm, community disapproval is the
predominant deterrence to misconduct; thus the stronger the community
involvement, the safer the community. Restorative justice is not private justice,299
and privatized corrections, focused as they are on profit, have only one goal: the
bottom line.
Another aspect of restorative justice where the participation of the community
has been critical is the reintegration and rehabilitation of prisoners when they are
released. 300 Community involvement has been absolutely vital in helping
reconstitute societal bonds with the offender after she has served her punishment.
Private corrections companies, however, are unconcerned with what happens with
offenders once they are no longer in their control. This is particularly ironic given
these companies’ level of involvement in alternative corrections, which theoretically
exist to help reintegrate the offender back into the community.
C. Psychological Effects of Racial Disparity in Privatized Corrections
The psychological effect upon offenders imprisoned in private corrections
cannot be ignored, especially given the substantial racial disparity among such
prisoners. Offenders incarcerated by private companies quickly learn that the
primary function of their imprisonment is to increase profits for the parent
companies. This is signaled in numerous ways, as detailed above, including
substandard facilities, care, programs, and supervision, along with dangerous
conditions and abuse.301 Far from absorbing the message that is meant to be sent by
the community—that they are being punished for their wrongdoing in injuring
society—these offenders learn only that they are at the bottom of the imprisoned
heap, not even valued enough to be punished by the government or local community.
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Furthermore, the message sent to the local community through the use of
private prisons is equally destructive. The use of private prisons and jails sends a
message to the offender’s community that it is acceptable to impose substandard
conditions upon offenders who are impoverished, non-white, or a combination of
the two.
For-profit prisons hold more people of color than government-run facilities, a
reality that has strong and troubling implications.302 First, the containment of people
of color, relative to “non-Hispanic, white[s],” functions primarily as a source of
profit extraction.303 Second, the incarceration in private prisons strongly suggests
that communities of color are seen as unworthy of taxpayer supported public
investment.304 The high level of minority offenders incarcerated in private prisons
also illustrates how they disproportionally suffer from facilities providing the least
access to educational and rehabilitative services. 305 Indeed, the substantial
overrepresentation of people of color in facilities controlled by for-profit firms
suggests that people of color are excluded from traditional national conceptions of
“the commons.”306 People of color continue to be seen in the national imagination
as sources of profit extraction and not necessarily as citizens deserving of public
services, thus continuing to be unable to participate fully in this nation’s democratic
experiment.307
Thus, the use of private corrections fails both the offender and the community
in the areas of expressive, retributive, and restorative justice. This is closely tied to
the community’s critical role to play in determining punishment for local offenders.
My other articles detail the community’s proper role in deciding punishment in the
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areas of bail, 308 sentencing, 309 probation, 310 parole, 311 post-release supervision, 312
and criminal justice debt,313 among others. Usually the role of the local community
ends post-sentencing hearing. The realities of prison privatizers and the many
different aspects of private punishment, however, should make us reconsider this
end. The need for more local participation in enacting punishment on offenders
unquestionably arises with the current grim realities of privatized punishment.
At its best, community-based criminal punishment provides for strong local,
popular participation within existing criminal justice institutions. As shown above,
when the actual imposition of sentence and punishment is taken away from local
governments and given to faceless, privatized companies, everything and everyone
suffers. As explored in Part IV, granting this power to for-profit privatizers exacts a
heavy cost on community rights, legitimate punishment, and local, democratic
control.
IV. RETURNING TO LOCAL CONTROL
Since the beginning of the American criminal justice system, we have relied on
the community to adjudicate crime and punishment. As William Stuntz contended,
“[m]ake criminal justice more locally democratic, and justice will be both more
moderate and more egalitarian.”314 This is because criminal justice creates value by
generating societal opinions of how best to apply legal rules and adjudicate
offenses.315 More specifically, it is the community’s shared principles of justice that
make the rule of law both workable and legitimate.316
The power of moral credibility and pressure of social norms also lend a hand
in obtaining compliance with society’s rules of conduct, by using the influence of
the forces of social and individual moral control. Local community-level social
processes have much more effect on the prevention and promotion of crime and
delinquency than do the characteristics of individual offenders.
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American normative theories of democracy and democratic deliberation have
always included community involvement in all aspects of criminal justice. The right
to a jury—the local community—to determine your guilt or innocence has always
been a seminal concept in American democratic theory. 317 If you accept that
conceptions of egalitarian moral worth are part of our culture’s normative values
and have therefore set the standards for acceptable treatment of people in our society,
then the lay citizenry must be part of the determination and imposition of
punishment, from the beginning of the criminal justice process to its endpoint.
A. Local Control
Despite our continual focus on federal crime and punishment, criminal justice
is a largely local process, with primarily local effects. As a result, the lay community
must be involved much more substantially in its application. Citizens need to
participate in criminal justice decisions to both legitimize criminal punishment and
make the process more democratic. Indeed, true democracy requires that we commit
both process and value to governance by the people.318
Traditionally, this participation has occurred through the auspices of the petit
or grand jury. However, as jury trials have dwindled to a mere 1–5% of criminal
justice adjudications, it is important to find other ways for the local community to
get involved. “[T]he most important benefit of localism in criminal justice [is] . . . its
tendency to make the enforcement of criminal law more responsive to the values,
priorities, and felt needs of local communities.”319 This localism benefit has always
been a particular hallmark of our criminal justice system, as crime has always been
specifically envisioned as an offense against the local community. In other words,
localism is inherent in the American conception of criminal punishment—indeed, it
is hardwired into our historical and constitutional understanding of criminal
justice.320
When criminal punishment parallels the community’s local understanding of
justice, the punishment gains legitimacy and promotes compliance by urging the
populace to view it as a moral authority in uncertain situations.321 Allowing private,
for-profit corrections companies to impose such punishment cuts this important link.
As Martha Minow has queried, what happens to these kind of public values when
public commitments proceed through private agents?322
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Minow herself partially answers her question, pointing out how many “new
versions of privatization potentially jeopardize public purposes by pressing for
market-style competition, by sidestepping norms that apply to public programs, and
by eradicating the public identity of social efforts to meet human needs.”323 These
concerns are particularly salient with privatized corrections, which combine profitbased motives with reduced services and hidden internal machinations, eradicating
any of the concerns and norms of the local community.
As Minow explains, there is a strong argument for viewing the regulation and
administration of correctional facilities as a public task, because the political system
currently assigns a monopoly over the legitimate use of force to the government.324
Minow argues that using private actors in the correctional context may undermine
the legitimacy of government action, since the public may suspect that their focus is
private profit-making, rather than the traditional purposes of criminal justice. 325
Indeed, allowing for-profit companies to provide services that previously were
public raises worrying questions about public participation in the criminal justice
system, as well as the effects this has upon the character of the polity.326
Privatizing corrections tends to fundamentally alter the relationship between
state and society in the criminal context. 327 This is because such privatization
removes punishment and corrections from the local and state governmental
control—control specifically delegated from the local community—and places it in
in the hands of for-profit companies that have minimal interest in reinforcing the
public norms underlying our basic assumptions of criminal justice.328 By entrusting
the decision-making and implementation of punishment to entirely private entities,
we not only cut off any last aspect of community involvement, but also cede to
private actors the sovereignty over a fundamental societal and community function:
the act of punishment.
Moreover, using private corrections companies creates the public perception
that the connection between the community and the imposition and regulation of
punishment has been cut. In our criminal justice system, it is the community’s role
to determine an offender’s punishment, while the actual administration of
punishment is normally delegated to the democratically elected local government.
But when the government then outsources this critical function to private, for-profit
companies, the community gets the message that their essential role—as determiners
of social norms—has been excised. No longer is the lay community’s voice or
message imposed. As the Israeli Supreme Court argued in a decision banning the
use of private prisons: “The administration of prisons and jails involves the legally
323
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sanctioned coercion of some citizens by others. This coercion is exercised in the
name of the offended public.” 329 Indeed, granting the power to inflict criminal
sanctions to private, for–profit companies neatly severs the link between the local
community’s adjudication of the offense/determination of punishment and the
infliction of the sanction.330
The role of the local becomes ever more important when we make a careful
study of privatized punishment. The worst excesses and greatest oversights all seem
to occur when private corrections entities eliminate any local investment or
interaction with incarceration and punishment, running all operations from one
nationwide center. Although this might promote efficiency and increase profits, the
effects of this one-size-fits-all approach can be disastrous for both offenders and
communities.
B. Delegation, Democracy, and the People
In addition to trampling on local, democratic participation in criminal justice,
allowing private prisons to impose sanctions and punishments on incarcerated
offenders is an inappropriate delegation of power. Despite some troubling historical
practices, punishment and the use of physical coercion have always been understood
as government prerogatives. 331 When state or local governments delegate the
authority to execute these duties to entities with dubious accountability to the public
interest,332 we run into serious problems. Although private entities often administer
state programs, usually those entities are not as directly involved in corporal
punishment as are the current crop of private corrections companies.
Another undemocratic aspect of privatized corrections is the imposition of
punishment for profit. Granted, in all corrections discipline, any alleged
transgression is adjudicated by an internal prison administrator—often minimally
trained—ranging from guards to the parole board to the probation officer. 333 In
private corrections, however, particularly privatized alternate corrections such as
probation, this imposition is more troubling. For every punishment imposed that
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extends an inmate’s term, the private corrections company makes more money. It is
a classic conflict of interest that has, until recently, gone largely unnoticed.334
As discussed in Part I, corrections officers generally make multiple disciplinary
decisions daily, with little oversight or review.335 These disciplinary decisions can
result in a loss of “good time credit,” which applies toward early release, or
placement in administrative segregation.336 In private jails and prisons, each loss of
good time credit means one more day incarcerated, which means one more day of
profit.337 Perhaps unsurprisingly, one study found that CCA inmates lost good time
credit at nearly eight times as much as did inmates in a state-run prison.338
The profit motive engendered by these private corrections companies creates
perverse incentives to extend inmate sentences and punishment. In addition, the
profit-based motives of private corrections companies reflexively promote criminal
justice policies that produce enhanced sanctions for the most minor of infractions,
without any consideration of whether the policies are in the public interest.339
Imposing punishment on incarcerated offenders also implicates an improper
delegation of the local community’s traditional role in adjudicating and imposing all
forms of punishment. The delegation of essential community and governmental
functions to private corrections companies poses a very real threat to democratic
accountability, the rule of law, and punishment.340
In addition, delegating the imposition of punishment to private companies
raises issues with transparency and public accountability, legitimacy, and nonpublic
motives.341 Each are discussed briefly below.
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1. Transparency and Public Accountability
It is extremely difficult to obtain any public accountability from private
corrections. Allowing for-profit companies to take over jails, prisons, probation, and
post-release supervision means increasing the veil of secrecy that already pervades
American corrections. Privatized correctional facilities operate with an almost
complete lack of transparency, as they are not subject to the kind of oversight
required for state and federal prisons.342 Indeed, “the private prison industry operates
in secrecy while being funded almost entirely with public taxpayer money.”343
This lack of transparency touches on a major requirement for imposition of
punishment on offenders: the need for accountability to the local community.
Because prisons, jails, and other sorts of correctional controls play a very public role
in our criminal justice system, it is necessary that the local community carefully
scrutinize the inner workings, in order to ensure that local punishment norms are
followed.
This opaqueness in private corrections goes against the tenets of restorative and
retributive justice, which focus on letting the local populace make transparent
decisions about punishment in full view of, and with oversight by, the greater
community. Although H.R. 2470, the “Private Prison Information Act,”344 which
requires greater transparency and Freedom of Information Act rights for the dealings
of private prison companies, was introduced in the House on May 20, 2015, the bill
was referred to committee and has lingered there ever since. 345 This means that
private, for-profit companies can continue to run correctional facilities however they
like, with little to hold them accountable. Even if the Federal Bureau of Prisons
ultimately decides to end its association with private corrections, this still leaves the
many state, local, and county offenders subject to the private corrections industry’s
arbitrary and undemocratic power to punish on the government’s behalf.
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Transparency is integral to the democratic project,346 and penal transparency
even more so. Generally, however, prisons and jails are not particularly
transparent,347 and private correction facilities even less so. There is very little public
information for prisons or jails, and virtually none for halfway houses, recovery
centers, and other correctional alternatives. As such, scholars have argued for
increased penal transparency in five areas: 1) physical safety; 2) health; 3)
institutional employment/education; 4) internal discipline; and 5) recidivism.348
This kind of transparency is even more necessary in the world of privatized
corrections. The vast majority of private facilities need not disclose information
arising from public records requests, as opposed to government-run prisons.349 As
noted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, “private prison
contractors . . . are not typically required to report on the inmates housed in privately
run prisons, do not make these data easily accessible to monitors, or are even aware
of the documentation and reporting requirements intrinsic to the operation of public
agencies.”350 Therefore, increasing public access to the workings of private facilities
would allow the much-needed scrutiny of correctional conditions and operations by
the local community.351
The need for transparency and public accountability in criminal punishment
applies to all kinds of corrections. Stephanos Bibas has written persuasively about
the great divide between insiders and outsiders in the criminal justice system, and
how this continuous secrecy impairs public confidence in the law.352 The private
corrections industry, however, has been the most resistant to providing any insight,
overview, or accountability in their practices, even within a secretive, closed-door
industry. We need a combination of transparency and accountability to not only
uphold the rights of people under criminal justice control,353 but also to vindicate the
rights of the local community to determine and administer punishment. Private
corrections’ refusal to open up their processes bypasses local control of punishment,
something that is inseparable from our democratic decision-making.
Likewise, the rush to privatize probation has given tremendous law
enforcement authority and oversight to for-profit companies, who have transformed
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punishment into a relentless machine for collection of criminal justice debt.354 Here,
as well, there is an almost complete lack of transparency. In many states, these
private probation companies do not fall under the state’s open records law, due to
private probation-sponsored statutes making all private probation records
confidential.355 Whatever the size of these private corrections companies, the public
must be able to obtain complete accountability and transparency without difficulty.
This is particularly important because the companies serve a public function in
criminal justice, thus acting as a proxy for the government itself.356
The cost of imprisonment is another compelling reason to require transparency
and accountability from private corrections companies, particularly given the false
promise of cost savings. Often the lay public accepts the takeover of local prisons,
jails, probation, halfway houses, and rehabilitation services because it believes this
will save money while providing the same services.357 Full knowledge of a private
corrections company’s transactions, however, might change the public acceptance
of private corrections companies. This includes such routine practices as
understaffing, poor or non-existent medical care, high interest on criminal justice
debts, elimination of in-person visitation, ruinous phone rates, and toxic food, all of
which can ultimately lead to higher costs for taxpayers. At minimum, requiring data
collection, record keeping, and publication of private correction records to force
transparency can help foster a public debate on the wisdom of corrections
privatization, hopefully promoting more rational decision-making in the realm of
criminal justice.358
The public requires sufficient information about the operation of these
privatized criminal justice institutions to properly judge the utility of such
operations. As the criminal justice system continues to privatize, there is ever more
of a need for transparency and accountability.359 It is likely that more transparency
will lead to less privatization, since the practices associated with the rampant costcutting of private corrections are not likely to survive serious scrutiny.
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2. Legitimacy
Americans do not have much confidence in the fairness or effectiveness of the
criminal justice system.360 As Jeffrey Fagan notes, “[t]he disquiet threatens to erode
the public perception that the criminal law and legal institutions are legitimate and
raises the prospect of disengagement of citizens from the important collaborations
that are essential to the co-production of security.”361 These observations ring even
more true when it comes to the perception and role of private corrections within our
criminal justice system.
Fagan articulates three major issues with criminal justice legitimacy, all of
which resonate strongly when considering using private corrections companies to
run criminal institutions. First, there are significant concerns about the criminal
system’s lack of procedural fairness and respectful, dignified treatment of citizens,
all of which erode legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 362 As Part I details, the
random, chaotic nature of institutions run by private correction companies, from the
casual, ingrained violence to the arbitrary imposition of excess punishment to the
callous disregard of medical needs, violate the basic tenets of procedural fairness
and dispense with dignity for the incarcerated or probationary citizen.
Second, Fagan argues that the legitimacy of the criminal justice system is
undermined by the public’s continually negative perception of the distribution of
justice, along with its growing apprehension over the proportionality and
consistency of legal responses to criminal behavior.363 This concern is particularly
applicable to the growing role of private probation, parole, and post-release
supervision, where private industry has squeezed an endless stream of money out of
the poorest of offenders. As discussed above, these probation companies frequently
function to indebt offenders, not to rehabilitate them. Such disproportionate
punishment of minor offenders, on top of the already existing punishment handed
down by the courts, is perceived as illegitimate and highly undemocratic. In the end,
endless criminal justice debt ends up imposing as much punishment for minor
offenses as for much greater offenses.
Fagan’s third point contends that criminal justice legitimacy is weakened by
concern over the criminal law’s waning capacity to detect wrongdoing and protect
citizens.364 Within the world of private corrections, privatized criminal institutions
routinely fail to detect wrongdoing and protect citizens within their walls, thus
undermining the belief in reliability and fairness that the public generally holds
about crime and corrections. The high rates of death, violence and injury in private
corrections destabilize any possible belief in the justice served in such institutions.
In addition, the relentless profit-squeezing occurring at virtually every private
corrections facility is enough to make any citizen doubt that these companies protect
360
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anything but their own self-interests. Privatized corrections makes a mockery out of
any legitimate protective role these institutions might have, and greatly destabilizes
community trust in the back end of the criminal justice system.
The criminal law derives some of its legitimacy from “citizens participat[ing]
as clients, overseers, and participants in the production of justice.”365 As discussed
in greater detail in Part V, one way in which privatized corrections could gain more
legitimacy in the people’s eyes would be to have more community oversight and
participation in its regulation. As Fagan argues, such a “regulatory function
influences not only the conduct of the institution, but also its perception by others
coming into contact with it.”366 Thus having the local community help oversee, at
minimum, the health, safety, basic offender living conditions, and profit margins of
these privatized corrections companies would not only improve the standards, but
also increase legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
3. Non-public Motives
As discussed in Part I, the lack of any public motive within private corrections
companies has created a system where the companies reduce inmate services and
quality of life to chase after every last cent. This is not to say that public,
government-run corrections have been any Shangri-La; indeed, various non-profits
have amply documented the problems with publicly-run correctional facilities.
But privatizing corrections means that decisions are not focused on the best
choice for the offenders or institution, but instead, the best choice for the company—
or, in the case of the largest privatized correction companies, what is best for the
shareholder. Fiduciary duty towards the shareholder in a publicly traded company
requires that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders.”367 Corporate law delineates that directors are bound by
fiduciary duties and standards, which include “acting to promote the value of the
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”368
Thus, publicly traded companies such as CCA and the GEO Group are legally
and ethically required to focus on profit as the primary motivation for each action
they take. In contrast, correctional facilities are (or are supposed to be) focused on
the needs of offenders. Privatizing corrections risks serious conflicts between public
and private interests,369 with public interest losing out to the profit motive.
In addition, even a small amount of for-profit motivation in a traditionally nonprofit sector can destabilize belief and deference for government. 370 This fate is
particularly dangerous for the criminal justice system, which has recently been under
great public scrutiny for its failures of justice.
365
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C. Delegating Imprisonment
Punishment and imprisonment has traditionally been a power reserved to the
government, whether federal, state, or local. Of course, some governmental
functions cannot be delegated at all. 371 Although delegating punishment and
imprisonment seems to pass constitutional muster, do we truly want to delegate the
function of incarcerating, punishing, deterring, and rehabilitating offenders to a
private entity,372 particularly one so focused on profit?
Granted, it is sometimes difficult to sharply separate public and private in our
modern governance.373 Some have argued that our system of privatization is less a
governmental withdrawal than a public-private partnership where there is a regime
of “mixed administration in which both public and private actors share
responsibilities.” 374 Instead, privatization tends to delegate power over
governmental programs to individual private actors.375 This is particularly true with
private corrections, “given that the right to physically constrain and coerce others is
ordinarily reserved for the state.” 376 When there is mixed private-public
administration, much of the discretion is left to the third-party private actors377—a
result that can be disastrous, as demonstrated, when it comes private corrections.
Alexander Volokh has argued that there is no inherent, normatively relevant
difference between public and private providers of government services, including
prisons. 378 Volokh contends that prison privatization does not violate the federal
non-delegation doctrine, since the doctrine, derived from Article I’s vesting clause,
focuses on how much power Congress gives up; in other words, it doesn’t matter
whether the recipient of the delegated power is public or private.379 Yet even Volokh
notes that for some states, the delegation doctrine is more cautious, warning that
private delegations can be more worrisome that public ones due to the possibility of
“public powers being abandoned to those who are neither elected by the people,
appointed by a public official or entity, nor employed by the government.”380
Even assuming that delegation of imprisoning and punishing offenders is
within constitutional bounds, however, there are numerous reasons why the private
corrections experiment of the last thirty years has not only been a failure, but has
also had detrimental cost to society. The average citizen feels very distanced from
371
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the inner workings of the criminal justice system. This distance is only increased by
the use of private correction companies. When we grant a for-profit company the
ability to control punishment, despite previous poor performance, it strongly signals
to local citizens that they are true outsiders to the criminal process.
Moreover, outsourcing corrections contracts to the lower bidder transmits the
message that once convicted, offenders are mere commodities like any other
product, with cost savings the only metric that matters. As Justice Arbel of the Israeli
Supreme Court contends, employing private corrections “undermines the moral
authority underlying the activity of that enterprise and public confidence in it, since
even if justice is done, it is not seen to be done.” 381 Public perceptions matter
tremendously in criminal justice, and the wrong perceptions are created when
privatized corrections are in charge.
V. RESTORING THE COMMUNITY ROLE IN IMPOSING PUNISHMENT
The role of the community in determining punishment, if expanded to its full
breadth, encompasses not just the ability to decide and impose appropriate
punishment, but also the right to determine the level of all the punishments that
follow sentencing. My previous articles have argued for the need for more
community participation in the back-end of sentencing: including parole, postsentence probation, and post-release supervision. 382 There is no reason that this
community participation and oversight could not extend to the wide realm of
punitive sanctions doled out in private prisons, jails, and the many forms of
alternative incarceration, like probation and halfway houses.
One practical way to help restore the community role in corrections punishment
is to require a rotating committee of citizens to help supervise any prison, jail or
alternative corrections facility run by a private, for-profit contractor.383 This would
include overseeing all aspects of private corrections as practiced, including
outsourced services such as prison food, banking, transportation, telephony,
visitation, and health care. Although general court oversight of prison systems is not
uncommon, there are few oversight boards or committees reviewing correctional
facilities, and very few with local citizen involvement.
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The criminal justice system is familiar with the use of oversight boards or
committees. Oversight boards and committees have been supervising and reviewing
police departments for the past twenty-five years, with some limited success. There
is no reason such boards could not be expanded to private correction facilities. As
we have seen, private corrections, more than any other form of corrections, is most
in need of community oversight.
Why use civilian community boards instead of court oversight? For one, court
oversight, which usually only results as a consequence of protracted litigation, can
be extremely expensive.384 In addition, obtaining a consent decree for a court (or the
federal government) to supervise a prison system is complicated and lengthy. In
contrast, putting together an oversight board of civilians, or a mix of the local public
and key community representatives, would be much easier and more efficient,
requiring the power of the local or state government at most.
Moreover, incorporating local citizens into the workings of private corrections
would ensure that a fresh take would be provided. Requiring the operations of
private prisons, jails, and alternative corrections to pass before the eyes of a
community oversight board would provide a window into any back-door dealings
and secret machinations. Enhancing local, popular participation within an existing
criminal justice institution,385 such as the private corrections industry, combines the
positives of community involvement without requiring new procedures or
immediate overhaul of the existing system.
An external evaluation system of private correction facility operations is
necessary, particularly considering the punitive sanctions imposed within. We
cannot rely on any of the current parties—the state/county or the private corrections
industry—to reliably protect the public interest. One way of achieving such public
scrutiny, transparency, and accountability, however, is through a careful, focused
use of a citizen oversight board. These citizen oversight boards have been used
successfully in New York 386 and Los Angeles, 387 for both police and sheriff’s
departments. The basic structure could easily be adapted to oversee the many levels
of private corrections that have evolved in today’s market.
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Oversight boards are nothing new. The call to oversee prisons, however, has
come with renewed force in recent years. Most recently, there has been popular
demand to oversee the New York state prison facilities, alleging that the New York
State Commission of Correction’s actions and oversight have been practically
useless. 388 This is no surprise. Having bureaucratic oversight of facilities run by
bureaucratic institutions, whether public or private, is unlikely to result in any major
change. It is critical that the community be heavily involved in such oversight,
particularly with private corrections facilities, to avoid such self-serving
administration.
There have been many calls for increased police transparency in the last few
years. So, too, should there be demands for increased corrections transparency,389
particularly those facilities run by private corrections companies. The ABA has
endorsed such oversight corrections commissions, urging states, the federal
government, and counties to “establish public entities that are independent of any
correctional agency to regularly monitor and report publicly on the conditions in all
prisons, jails, and other adult and juvenile correctional and detention facilities
operating within their jurisdiction.”390
What would this independent citizen corrections commission look like? First,
it would need to be staffed primarily with community members, possibly along with
former prisoners and representatives from major religious organizations (since these
institutions are often intricately involved in post-incarcerative life). All of these
commission members would need to serve two to three years at minimum, 391
perhaps on a staggered routine to ensure continuity, to enable working smoothly and
efficiently.
Critically, the private corrections oversight commission would need subpoena
power and full access to all correction facility documents. The head of each private
prison, as well as the heads of the privatized jails, halfway houses, and
probation/post-release supervision programs, would need to report to such a
commission on a regular basis, perhaps twice yearly, possibly more if there are
persistent problems in any one sector of offender punishment.
What would this commission decide? To be truly useful, it would need to have
real power to oversee and change practices in whichever correctional facility or
alternative that it oversees. These powers would need to carefully scrutinize and
oversee every aspect of the programs that could affect the punishment of offenders,
including at minimum: the use of force, particularly in “disciplining” inmates;
conditions of confinement; the hiring, retention, and treatment of facility staff; the
388
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use of solitary confinement, especially as a punitive measure; re-entry planning; the
procedures for parole or probation violations; and privatized health care and
transport, whether these are used by private or state-run corrections. Moreover, there
would likely need to be a subsection of the committee that reviewed complaints and
allegations of wrongdoing, including inmate grievances, abuse claims, denial of
access to health care and inmate deaths.392
As the ABA has noted about prisons in general, “[p]risoners still live in a
netherworld with which few of us are familiar. . . . the operations of correctional and
detention facilities [should] be transparent and accountable to the public they
serve.”393 This is all the more true for private prisons, jails, probation, parole and
halfway houses—with such minimal transparency, the inner workings of such
facilities need overview and overhaul. Despite this obvious need for correctional
oversight, though, it is relatively rare to find any independent supervisory
commission whose findings are disseminated to the public in the United States,394
let alone any independent commission that oversees private correctional facilities.
In contrast, prisons in EU member countries are subject to independent monitoring
by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture.395
The ABA section on criminal justice has recently called for independent public
entities to monitor and publicly report on conditions in prisons, jails, and other
correctional and detention facilities for both adults and juveniles in their
jurisdictions, whether public or private. The ABA has underlined the necessity of
accessing such facilities and programs; only by granting lay entities broad and
unhindered access to private facilities and programs, correctional personnel, and
offenders, as well as any data about these conditions and procedures, will any
accurate view emerge about the operations.
Since corrections deals with extremely vulnerable populations, it is critical to
provide adequate safeguards to protect those who communicate with the monitoring
entity from retaliation or threats of retaliation.396 And because obstruction, codes of
silence, and layers of secrecy often surround corrections in general—and private
corrections in particular—the citizen commission must have the power to subpoena
witnesses and documents.397
These powers would need to be combined with random, surprise assessments
of confinement conditions conducted by said private prison commissions, in order
to ensure that reports from these for-profit corrections are accurate. Such personal
visits would provide both transparency and accountability from the private
punishment industry.
Each report by the commission should also be made available to the public on
a timely basis, electronically and through media coverage.398 This will increase the
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transparency of the workings of the private corrections, as well as put pressure on
the commission, the government, and the for-profit owners to change any
substandard practices.
Certainly all correctional facilities and alternative corrections could use this
type of oversight. But in a world of limited resources and time, the first place to start
such monitoring would be in the world of for-profit, privatized corrections, which,
as shown, have suffered the worst abuses.
There are numerous civilian review boards for the police, but there are few
truly independent, community commissions to oversee state and local corrections,
let alone private corrections. New York State has a correctional oversight board, run
by the Correctional Association of New York, an NGO. 399 The Correctional
Association of New York has been visiting prisons and reporting on conditions of
confinement, under a legislative mandate for the past 165 years.400 The Board of
Directors of this organization is comprised of private citizens including “prominent
citizens, lawyers, advocates, formerly incarcerated individuals, individuals
associated with community-based organizations . . . and academics,”401 but few lay
citizens serve on the oversight board itself.
Although this is definitely a step in the right direction, the best bet would to
have true lay diversity on the visiting committee itself, instead of members appointed
by the mayor. This would permit the local citizenry to be more involved in the
procedures at their local correctional facilities. Indeed, as one prison scholar notes,
incorporating the local community in oversight roles helps improve correctional
facilities by their very presence: “In facilities that confine people, the presence of
civilian overseers humanizes everyone—inmates and staff—and makes the prison a
better, more effective, and more enlightened institution for all.”402
In contrast, England has a much more comprehensive vision of prison
oversight, containing three separate branches: a Prison Inspectorate that routinely
inspects all correctional facilities and places of detention; a Prison Ombudsman to
investigate prisoners’ complaints; and a system of Independent Monitoring Boards
comprised of lay citizens, each monitoring a specific facility.403
Of course, as has been noted elsewhere, prison oversight is a many-tentacled
beast, involving regulation, audit, accreditation, investigation, legal oversight,
reporting, and inspection/monitoring,404 among other roles. This Article’s vision for
a civilian oversight board for private prisons would primarily focus on investigating
reported problems and inspection/monitoring, similar to England’s Independent
399
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Monitoring Boards. The other aspects of oversight would be best assumed by either
a state or federal oversight body.
The Independent Monitoring Boards of Britain and Wales merit some
particular attention, as they are comprised almost entirely of local citizens. Anyone
may apply to be on a monitoring board, and vacancies are routinely advertised.405
Members are expected to serve two days per month. The members may enter the
prison at any time, can go anywhere in the prison (subject to security considerations
and personal safety), and can inquire into anything (except confidential medical
files).
Independent Board Monitors visit their designated prison regularly, usually
unannounced, as often as once a week; listen to the requests, concerns, and
complaints of prisoners and report them if necessary; visit the kitchen, healthcare
unit, and segregation units; and meet once a month, along with the director of the
prison, to discuss inspection results and any concerns.406 In addition, Board members
are encouraged to publish their annual reports, which are publicly available on the
Boards’ websites and issued to the press.407
Despite the fact that these Independent Board Monitors are not executive
bodies, and thus cannot demand action, their oversight has been extremely positive,
improving offender treatment and increasing their protection from abuse and illtreatment.408 This positive influence stems largely “through the actual presence—in
the prison, in the cells, on the landings and in the exercise yards—of people from
the outside world.”409 In other words, the interjection of the local community has
worked wonders towards ensuring that the conditions and punishment imposed upon
offenders were appropriate.
The best short-term way to tackle the problems of privatized corrections is to
require the local community to oversee these institutions to help improve conditions
of incarceration. In the long run, however, we must eliminate both the piecemeal
and wholesale outsourcing of criminal punishment to private, for-profit entities.
CONCLUSION
Privatizing corrections monetizes the criminal justice system in a deeply
disturbing way, rooted in a shameful history of slavery, Jim Crow, and greed.
Profiting from the physical incarceration and regulation of other humans, a function
normally and properly only performed by a locally elected government, is not only
distasteful and often inhumane, but has serious, deleterious effects on offenders,
communities, and the proper functioning of punishment in our society.
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Nonetheless, it appears that privatizing corrections has taken a firm hold of the
criminal justice system, from the beginning (privatized probation and
transportation), to the middle (private jails, prisons, and services), to the end
(privatized halfway houses, recovery homes, and post-release supervision). Such
privatization is so pervasive that most citizens fail to realize its extent, or their role
as unwilling investors in large private corrections companies.
The ultimate solution is, of course, forbidding any private, for-profit ownership
or investment in corrections and punishment. In a time where privatization is
generally lauded as a public good, this goal, however, is likely to take time and
tremendous effort. So, what to do in the meantime?
The community must play a part. By taking a strong, proactive role in
overseeing private corrections through the use of citizen oversight boards, the lay
citizenry can help ensure that these for-profit entities are meeting minimal standards
in living conditions, health care, food services, the imposition of discipline, the
regulation of violence, and the general welfare of offenders.
The ultimate goal must be eradicating the profit motive from corrections. This
eradication may be a long and drawn-out struggle, however, given the continual
budget woes of states and counties. Coming up with innovative short-term solutions
involving the local community may therefore be the best and fastest way to begin to
combat the growing trend of cashing in on convicts.

